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Fraud on the Internet is develop-
ing into a major issue for con-
sumers, businesses, and
governments [1, 6, 10]. The
Financial Times in 2003 called
online fraud “an epidemic of
huge and rapidly growing pro-
portions” and noted the inci-
dence of fraud was 20 times
higher online than offline [12].
The complaints of online fraud
registered at the IC3 Web site—
which is jointly sponsored by the
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion and the U.S. National White
Collar Crime Center—have
grown from around 20,000 in
2000 to around 200,000 in
2007, which represents a com-
pound annual growth rate of
39% [7]. At the same time, the
dollar value of losses has skyrock-
eted at an annual rate of 50%
from less than $18 million in
2001 to over $200 million in
2007 [7].
One area that is particularly
interesting is auctions. Auction
fraud reported to the Federal
Trade Commission has likewise
grown tremendously from 106 in
1997 to around 24,000 in 2007
[9] and continues to climb dra-
matically. Internet auction fraud
is one of the main sources of
overall Internet fraud, with esti-
mates of incidence from 64% to
87% of all Internet fraud [4, 7].
However, major Internet auction
sites estimate that fraud is
involved only once in approxi-
mately 10,000 auctions [9],
which appears to contradict these
observations.
When it comes to online auctions, “caveat emptor”
is an understatement.
REDUCING INTERNET
AUCTION FRAUD
By Bezalel Gavish and Christopher L. Tucci
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Understanding fraud with respect to Internet auc-
tions is especially important because the oft-cited
“network externality” in which having large numbers
of buyers leads to large numbers of sellers, which leads
to even more buyers, and so on. It is based upon the
knowledge that the winner of the auction will receive
what he or she was expecting. If more than a handful
of buyers perceive that the system does not work in a
fair and neutral manner, the entire network effect
may start unraveling.
If the claim of such a low level of fraud were true,
an auction site could encourage a higher level of buyer
activity (and prices bid) by charging a minimal sur-
charge on the final winning bid to provide automatic
insurance to buyers. Analyzing one auction site, we
found that a one-dollar increase in the final winning
bid translates into over $700 million in annual dollar
volume. A surcharge of one promille per dollar of the
final price above the additional transaction costs such
as bookkeeping, investigation of claims, and issuing
of compensation should be enough to provide insur-
ance and to leave ample additional profit for the auc-
tion site operator. The fact that insurers do not offer
such policies calls into question industry’s estimates of
fraud incidences.
This procedure is not as simple as it sounds, as hav-
ing automatic insurance would have an effect on the
behavior of both buyers and sellers. Buyers will be
willing to tolerate a higher level of risk and bid higher
even for unknown sellers, or sellers with lower levels
of reputation. Another complication is that it creates
incentives for crooked sellers and buyers to form
coalitions in which they swindle the auction operator
or the insurance entity. The advantage of an auction
site operator compared to the occasional buyer or
seller is that the operator has the resources and expe-
rience to develop methodologies that detect and
reduce such swindling operations to a minimal level.
By providing automatic insurance, the auction site
operator would benefit from the higher level of vol-
ume in bidding activity.
We concentrate on buyers being swindled. In our
study we discovered that sellers face a similar problem
of cheating; however, auction houses have devoted
extensive resources toward protecting sellers, but have
invested limited effort into protecting buyers. Why?
We contend that if sellers do not put items up for auc-
tion, the site cannot survive, while bidders/buyers on
their own do not justify the existence of an auction
site.
Another factor involves the fact that most sellers
use the auction site multiple times (in many cases,
thousands of times). As a result they develop experi-
ence and methods that protect them. Bidders, on the
other hand, have limited experience with the auction
process and do not have the expertise to protect them-
selves.1 For example, in most auction sites, sellers do
not ship a product to the buyer until the buyer has
paid for the product.
RESEARCH SUMMARY
We employed a variety of methods to undertake an
exploratory investigation of Internet auction fraud.
We performed a literature review of prior empirical
studies on Internet fraud and auction fraud. This led
to a preliminary and exploratory survey conducted
in 2003. Our survey results also helped guide our
participant-observation exploration: We bought and
sold on major auction sites from 2003–2005 to bet-
ter understand how swindlers work and what actions
might be taken by the auction houses and by buyers.
We also interviewed bidders and sellers that con-
tacted us through our own buying and selling.
In our exploratory pilot study (see [5]), we sur-
veyed 1,298 winners of Internet auctions at a major
auction site to see whether they received what they
were expecting. The respondents came from 14 dif-
ferent item categories and a full range of prices. We
asked primarily two questions and collected other
information from the auction site itself.
1. Did you receive any item after you won the auc-
tion in question?
2. If you did receive an item, was it what you were
expecting?
We interviewed willing respondents to our survey. It
was difficult to gather the data using automatic
means, so we did everything manually. Generally
speaking, auction houses put many obstacles to pre-
vent automatic data gathering for such a research
investigation. They limit the number of interactions
one can have with other members per day. Thus, it
is not obvious how to do such a study.
Staying within the rules set up by the auction
houses, we were prevented from using mechanical
methods such as Web crawlers; otherwise, it would
have been much easier to contact a large number of
auction winners. Further, the auction houses are will-
ing to give researchers information, but what they
offer is mostly meaningless for such a study. For
example, looking simply at feedback does not convey
much information. It carries a value of 0, neutral, or
1, so there is no magnitude. For example, a “winner”
in Athens, Greece, whom we talked to lost close to
1This can be ascertained by observing the distribution of the number of transactions
or the number of feedback ratings for sellers and buyers.
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$10,000 and felt very strongly
about his loss. His situation and
(negative) feedback for the seller
carried the same weight as some-
one who lost one dollar in an
auction.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The results of our preliminary
survey are as follows: We
received 98 responses from the
auction “winners,” 21 of which
either did not receive any item at
all, or did not receive what they
were expecting (mostly because
the item was damaged or other-
wise in worse shape than
described). Further, eight out of
98 received absolutely nothing at all, which repre-
sents 0.62% minimum (assuming everyone else,
including non-respondents, received something, as
we will discuss). This incidence would be 62 times
higher than official estimates of fraud, and this is
clearly a subset of all fraud.
If either the buyer received nothing or did not
receive what was expected, we call that “swindled”
(recognizing, of course, that the buyer may or may
not have been intentionally swindled and that this is
definitely a superset of purely fraudulent activity).
Still, knowing the incidence of “swindling” is important
because it most certainly is an input into buyers’ percep-
tions of the fairness of auctions.
We calculate the worst-case rate of negative
response (by dividing the total negatives by total
responses) and the best-case rate (by dividing the total
negatives by total contacted). It depends on how one
views the representativeness of our sample to know
which is more “accurate.” If one feels that the respon-
dents are representative of the population at large,
then the worst-case estimate would be closer. If one
feels that our respondents are “disgruntled,” then the
best-case estimate would be closer.
In addition, we have two opposing factors. For
those who are embarrassed about being cheated, they
will be underrepresented. They do not want to report
that they were cheated because it would make them
look foolish. On the other hand, there are people who
were cheated on one auction and are so mad they
want to tell their story, even if we asked them about a
different auction, and that will lead to overestimation.
The true rate would most likely fall somewhere in
between the best- and worst-case estimates.
The percentage of negative responses varied for dif-
ferent categories of auctions (see Figure 1). Comput-
ers and electronics had the highest worst-case rate of
negative responses: three-quarters of respondents
either did not receive their computer or it arrived
damaged. In terms of the best-case rates, the worst
category was Jewelry (excluding watches), in which
5% of all auction winners contacted either did not
receive anything at all or did not receive what they
were expecting. Four categories had no negative
responses (Paintings; Guitars; Event Tickets; and
Watches). One surprise was that Jewelry, excluding
watches, had one of the worst rates of dissatisfaction,
while Watches had one of the best. In one category,
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Figure 1. Dissatisfaction
rates for different
categories.
Auction houses have devoted extensive resources
toward protecting sellers, but have invested limited effort into
protecting buyers. Why?
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Sports memorabilia, we received
no responses at all. Of course,
these category measures should
be taken with a grain of salt, as
the number of responses within
each category is quite low. Still,
the overall response indicates a
worst-case estimate of 21.4%
negative, with a best-case (and
conservative) estimate of 1.6%
negative.
We also found the following
contingencies:
• Price does not appear to be a
very good predictor of
whether the buyer was swin-
dled;
• 25% of the respondents who
won auctions with a selling price below an insur-
ability cutoff of $500 were “swindled,” versus
only 5% of those winners whose items sold for
more than the cutoff (we will discuss “moral haz-
ard” later);
• The location of the seller is not related to
whether the item arrived intact in our sample;2
• Having a photo is not associated with whether
anything was received; and
• 26% of respondents whose auctions had a photo
did not receive the item intact vs. only 11% of
auction winners where there was no photo.
Perhaps one lesson to be learned from this break-
down is that buyers appear to be more careful in sit-
uations in which the dangers are more obvious.
Based on a survey of literature (for example, [2, 3,
10]), plus our interviews, plus our own participation
in auctions, we derived some generalities in the swin-
dling area. First, there are the methods used to actu-
ally execute the swindle. Second, there are methods
used to avoid appearing fraudulent. The main meth-
ods used to actually execute the swindle are shown in
Figure 2, while the methods used by swindlers to
appear as a legitimate seller to potential bidders are
shown in the accompanying table.3
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO REDUCE FRAUD?
Our findings, although preliminary, could spell
trouble for bidders in online auction sites, and ulti-
mately the sites themselves. Even though the num-
ber of buyers and sellers has been rising rapidly over
the last decade, any sudden shift in perception could
reverse the cycle [10]: Buyers afraid of being swin-
dled will stop participating, thus fewer buyers,
meaning fewer sellers, and so on.
We have several broad categories of recommenda-
tions based on our study. In this section, we review
each category and give specific recommendations to
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Selling cheap items
Taking advantage of 
pooled buyer-seller 
feedback
Changing seller ID
Changing terms
Changing location
Phishing
To establish a good track record, they put up many low cost (a few dollars) items for 
sale and provide excellent service. The feedback from the buyers is highly positive. 
Once an excellent track record has been established, they go for the kill by putting 
up for bid expensive items that are never delivered. Once discovered, they repeat the 
same process under a different identity.
Some auction houses provide rating for sellers and buyers, but they do not distinguish 
between the seller's past selling and buying feedback. Smart swindlers buy and sell 
many items for a penny or so. They provide excellent feedback to the sellers. Once 
they have established a long positive record, they put up items for auction.
Using several IDs so there is no track record. Auction houses try to overcome such 
practices by requiring sellers to provide legitimate credit card information in order to 
receive a seller ID. Unfortunately it is easy for swindlers to receive several credit 
cards and use them to open accounts on the auction site as sellers.
Changing the payment method. For example claiming that they accept credit card 
payment but after the auction, insisting on non-credit card payments.
Use Internet broadband phone service to establish a U.S. phone number. Use a fake 
U.S. shipping address while actually being based overseas.
Phishing can provide sellers with fake IDs and other information that permits them to 
take over an established high rating user account.
Methods swindlers user
to appear legitimate.
Buyers afraid of being swindled will stop participating,
thus fewer buyers, meaning fewer sellers, and so on.
2Although if we think that swindlers use fake U.S. addresses, we would not expect the
location to be associated with swindling. Incidentally, broadband Internet phone ser-
vice—wherein non-U.S. swindlers can obtain U.S. phone numbers and answer them
anywhere in the world—while providing a very valuable service to legitimate cus-
tomers, is actually exacerbating this problem.
3Buying and selling on the Internet is a very dynamic system that is evolving over time.
For every fraud detection procedure that auction houses institute, swindlers adapt and
deploy countermeasures that overcome the new defenses. We realize that we might not
have covered every method; if a reader knows of anything else, please send it to us so
we can continue with our larger follow-up study.
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reduce auction fraud along with the advantages and
disadvantages of doing so. The broad categories are
the following:
1. Increase the information shared by auction
houses on buyers and sellers.
2. Make the use of legitimate escrow services
extremely easy, and possibly mandatory.
3. Charge the seller an amount equal to the
amount of the sale (temporarily).
4. Develop sensible insurance policies.
5. Institute regulatory
control over the
auction houses.
6. Encourage buyers to
protect themselves.
Note that the first cate-
gory is probably the
most important, and
the first and last are the
easiest to implement.
Information on sell-
ers. Generally speaking,
the more information is
disclosed on sellers (and
buyers) the easier it is
for buyers and sellers to
verify that they are deal-
ing with a reputable
entity, leading to a
higher degree of confi-
dence in the system.
The problem now is
that the system is based
on self-reporting by
both buyers and sellers.
The auction house can-
not guarantee that the
information they pro-
vide is accurate.4 It is still the responsibility of the
buyer and seller to verify the data.
Auction houses collect a significant amount of
data. Making more of it public increases the chances
that a transaction will be valid. Here is some data that
should be posted for all reputation scores:
• The percentage of positive responses of the total
number of transactions for sellers (some sites
began doing this in 2003) rather than the
absolute number. In many cases, the auction
houses only reveal the number of positive scores,
thus if someone sells 1,000 items, of which 100
are positive, she or he would have a higher score
than someone with 99 positives out of 99 auc-
tions.
• As mentioned in the table and discussed in Chua
and Wareham [2], some sellers sell (or buy) a
large number of cheaper items to establish their
reputation. To address
this, we propose posting
the average selling price
(or a distribution of
selling prices) of all the
seller’s previous auc-
tions. It would be even
better to divide it into
months and also by
item category.
• Separate statistics for
selling vs. purchasing.
This reduces the
chances that a seller can
establish a positive rep-
utation by simply buy-
ing many low-cost
items, which he subse-
quently sells thus dou-
bling his positive score.
• Seller activity history
(not score) as a func-
tion of time. The pat-
tern of activity and
dollar value can provide
clues to participants.
• The number of distinct users (buyers) that partic-
ipated in creating a reputation history for a seller.
• Statistics on the number and percentage of cases
in which the seller was not paid, or buyer did not
pay (indicates a shill bidder running up the price
if it happens too often).
• Information on the seller, for example, listing the
physical (as opposed to electronic) address for
payment at the end of the auction. Such physical
information can help determine if this is a legiti-
mate seller or a swindler. In addition, there are
Internet-based tools that could be used to disin-
guish real from purely virtual sellers. Auction
houses could accomplish this by sending a physi-
cal letter to the postal address of the registered
user, much as a bank sends a PIN under separate
cover to a postal address.
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM May 2008/Vol. 51, No. 5 93
Auction
“winner”
Empty
box /
worthless
Product
with
inferior
component
sent
Promised
product
delivered
but value
has declined
Alternate
product
with
inferior
component
Refund
requested,
paid in 60
days
Damaged /
non-
functional
product
sent
Refund
offered
after X
(~45) days
No
refund,
seller
keeps
cash
Wait for Y
(~14)
more days
Accept
refund
immediately,
paid in 60
days
Initial
non-
delivery
of item
Fake
escrow
company
Fake
shipping
company
Fake US
business
address
Auction
“loser”
Unsolicited
proposal
for same
item
Initial
shipment
takes
places
Shill
bidding
Figure 2. Possible Internet auction
swindling methods.
4Using tools available on the Net it is possible to verify a significant part of the infor-
mation needed to establish the person or company identity, for example, does a per-
son with that name exist in his address? Is the phone number associated with him? Is
such a company declared and filed with his local authorities? What is his educational
background? Does he have a family? With whom did he deal in the past? In some
cases, what is his credit score? The amount of useful data that can be collected on the
Internet pertaining to an individual is surprising.
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• Some auction houses limit the history available
on auction results. For example, eBay gives out
details (details about individual item auctions) for
only 90 days after activity. A crook makes sure
she or he goes 90 days back and gets good com-
ments selling cheap items, then does not sell too
many items for 90 days. The auction houses can
do better by keeping the history longer. (This
would raise the cost of storage but we do not feel
that it would be a very large expense amortized
over many auctions; further it would increase
confidence and liquidity.)
• Give out actual email addresses or at least release
actual email addresses and other information to
the other party under certain circumstances. For
example, auction winners could demand it before
final payment takes place. Auction houses could
inform the seller automatically that their infor-
mation has been given to the winning buyer.
Auction houses now avoid this practice to prevent
buyers and sellers from taking their transactions
“offline” and thus circumventing some of the fees
charged by the auction house.
• Flags based on statistical analyses of past behavior
by sellers (for example, using quality control
methods). For example, if price skyrockets or vol-
ume jumps dramatically for this seller, the auc-
tion would be “flagged” for all bidders to see,
thus raising awareness of the potential for swin-
dling. The seller could have the flag removed
through some certification process, for example,
proving that he or she actually has the items.
Another alternative is the computer gives the
item the flag and the seller has the choice of con-
tinuing or not.
• Develop efficient methods for bidders to alert the
auction houses about swindling sellers. Swindlers
can discover the response times of auction houses
to swindling alerts, for example how quickly do
they remove a false auction, or announce the exis-
tence of a swindler to the bidding community?
Based on the expected response time information,
swindlers design the timing of their selling activ-
ity.
• Mechanism for alerting other users about sellers.
This one must be treated very carefully. The
advantage is that by quickly getting the word out,
one avoids others from falling victim to the
swindler. On the other hand, it is difficult to
adjudicate and decide when someone should be
“blacklisted.” It could be that a buyer hates a
seller and uses it for revenge; or purely for strate-
gic reasons, a buyer gives out some alert that
reduces the price so the buyer himself can get a
better price! Or, a seller can use such a mecha-
nism to remove (temporarily) other sellers of
competing items. It is understandable why auc-
tion houses have shied away from this one, but
perhaps some kind of “Amber Alert” for auction
swindlers could be developed, perhaps by holding
accusers responsible for issuing the alert.
• Divide sellers into classes based on their past per-
formance and rating by buyers. Use different flags
to identify reliable sellers from less reliable ones
(for example, classes of power users on eBay).
Advantages and disadvantages. The more informa-
tion buyers and sellers have on each other, the better
off they are. We should keep in mind that this addi-
tional information can be used by swindlers to bet-
ter target their messages/offers to potential victims.
Auction houses, on the other hand, have interests in
protecting the identity of buyers and sellers, so it is
a question of balance. All of these involve disclosing
information about buyers and sellers (mainly sell-
ers). In our opinion, however, legitimate sellers
should be happy to reveal their information to ben-
efit from the price premium of being reliable.5 This
direct cost is negligible, involving hiring a few peo-
ple to develop the algorithms and the software to
display the new calculations.
Escrow. Extremely easy, seamless, and possibly
mandatory escrow services should be available for all
auctions. A small service charge could be added to the
listing fee to facilitate the transaction. We propose the
following modifications to the escrow systems cur-
rently in place:
• Traders should only use escrow services officially
certified by the auction house. Auction houses
should develop a list of escrow services that they
have certified and provide a direct link to the
sites.
• Shipping the item to a third reliable party, who
inspects it, instructs the buyer to pay the seller,
and once payment (or proof ) has been received,
transfers the item to the buyer. This incurs an
extra shipping cost, which may make it prohibi-
tive for less expensive items; still, for expensive
items, the shipping cost is minor compared to the
cost of the item.
• We notice that the premium to reputation is
about 20% on expensive items. There is a busi-
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5Revealing the sellers identity on the auction site could be an option that the seller
selects, thus giving the indication that he is legitimate. Sellers of very expensive items
(cars), list in the body of the listing information that allows potential buyers to verify
that they do exist and do business (their dealership title, address, phone number, vehi-
cle location and stock number, VIN, and many pictures of the car).
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ness opportunity for an “intermediary” to come
in, receive the item before the auction, verify it,
and then put a seal of approval/authenticity of
that auction [2]. The seller would receive a better
price, which would be shared with the intermedi-
ary. The fact that such a service does not exist
raises some questions. Auction houses could also
make a feature that enables one entity to certify
another’s auction. Even having an apparent certi-
fication by such an entity is not a guarantee.6
• A casual browsing of auction sites reveals that sell-
ers often give blatant instructions not to check
out through the official auction checkout proce-
dure. These sorts of circumventions should be
monitored and policed more effectively. It could
even be done in an automated way by searching
for keywords proposing to circumvent the check-
out procedure.
• Some sellers offer money-back guarantees if the
buyer is not happy with the items he won. What
is lacking is a mechanism that actually enforces
that offer when a buyer is unhappy.
Advantages and disadvantages. The advantages
include a steep reduction in information asymme-
tries at the expense of swindlers. Information asym-
metries exist when one party does not know
everything relevant to a transaction that the other
party knows. The schemes proposed here increase
the knowledge of buyers about the quality (or even
existence!) of the items to be sold. The disadvantages
include greater transaction costs, even in the more
mild versions and the possible exclusion of some
buyers from the market (some buyers are willing to
take a chance on being swindled for a lower price—
those buyers would be priced out of a market in
which escrow was mandatory). One could imagine
an extension of this in which only auctions closing
above a certain dollar amount were forced to adopt
some of these techniques.
Performance Bond. To open an account as a seller
or buyer, one needs a credit card. The auction house
should charge the seller an amount equal to the
amount of the sale (temporarily). Then, once the
buyer gives the go-ahead, the auction house would
reverse the charge.7 Auction sites already do this on
the buyer side. The amount charged could also be
based on the seller’s reputation or other characteristics
of the seller (such as, how many prior items sold at the
current price range). This “seller escrow” would also
benefit sellers without an established reputation. If the
credit card transaction is rejected, than the auction
house knows that this is not a legitimate seller and will
remove his or her ID and items from the auction site.
The auction site would also know immediately that
they are probably dealing with a swindler.
The company would need to provide a cash flow
management guarantee (return your money within,
for example, one day), though, to protect those legit-
imate sellers who make a living selling on auctions.
Even so, most sellers would only take a one-day hit
because after the first day, they would be applying
their performance bond to future auctions.
Advantages and disadvantages. The performance
bond is a very strong level of protection and would
sharply increase trust in the system as well as sharply
reduce swindling. However, it is fundamentally a little
unfair as it requires sellers to be relatively well-off,
with enough credit on their credit card to pay for the
items they already own. If someone was auctioning off
items to raise money, say for a hospital bill, and they
were already in debt, they would not be able to par-
ticipate as a certified seller under this system. An alter-
native could be some kind of certification by the
auction house for unusual circumstances, but this is
likely to fail for two reasons: the auction houses would
like to avoid certifying individual sellers for legal rea-
sons; and the less “automated” the process, the more
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6Choicepoint is an example of a false and dishonest entity that appeared as a legitimate
business for a number of years.
7Some car rental and hotel companies use a similar method to protect themselves
against nonpaying customers.
The schemes proposed here increase the
knowledge of buyers about the quality (or even existence!)
of the items to be sold.
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likely that actual swindlers would be able to pass off
as legitimate customers. A third alternative could be
the encouragement of third-party certifiers (or surety
bond companies) such as BuySafe, which certify sell-
ers for a commission—paid by the seller on items
sold—and promise to compensate buyers if there is a
problem.
Insurance. Appropriate insurance policies could
encourage electronic commerce activities. Premia
should be reasonable, and mechanisms designed to
reduce or prevent collusion. The way it would work
would be that the buyer would pay a premium to the
insurance company and if there is a problem, the
buyer makes a claim and is reimbursed. Here are a few
possible recommendations for insurance:
• Insurance by payment beforehand. At the
moment the auction is consummated, the buyer
is charged a premium based on the seller’s reputa-
tion and the category. These are both known in
advance and so could be prominently advertised
within the auction itself while it is going on. The
buyer would pay the premium, although there
would be nothing preventing the seller from sub-
sidizing or even paying the premium him- or her-
self, just as some sellers pay for shipping.
• Insurance companies should be certified by the
auction house, with recommended insurers
linked directly from the auction house.
• Insurance premium size should be tied to the
level of fraud in the category and the past reputa-
tion/insurance claim activity related to the seller.
Insurers would then have the tools to go after
swindlers and to increase the cost of being a
crook.
• Another option is that the seller would be
required to take out the policy.
Advantages and disadvantages. Smarter insurance
policies would make the market fairer, especially if
taking out a policy were mandatory. It would be fair
because buyers would be hedged against absolute
fraud and would not lose their money. In addition,
the market for insuring fraud would become more
efficient, because there are relatively few insurers and
they would be scrutinizing the antecedents of fraud
and pricing the risk accordingly as their own money
would then be on the line if they are wrong. The dis-
advantage is that on the margin, the increased trans-
action cost would exclude some buyers. In addition,
there could be a moral hazard problem in that buy-
ers would be participating in riskier auctions (ones
they estimate might have a fraudulent outcome) but
they do not care as much because their insurance
coverage provides a safety net.
Regulatory control. State or federal governments
in the U.S. and elsewhere may want to make sure that
the auction houses follow the rules set in their own
descriptions of the mechanisms. There is a need for
an agency that confirms they follow without bias the
rules they advertise. Auction houses have at their dis-
posal the ability to take advantage of situations in
which they can make extra money at the expense of
sellers and/or buyers, just as a real estate agent could
conceivably buy and then resell a house rather than
showing it to a potential buyer. We are not claiming
that auction houses intervene in the auction markets
frequently, but in fact who would know if they did or
did not? Are the auction houses completely neutral?
Some sort of government oversight might be helpful
in this area.
In return for submitting to regulatory control (and
for taking some proactive steps toward reducing fraud
as outlined in this article), we propose that auction
houses could be shielded from some forms of legal lia-
bility in fraud prevention. It could be that auction
houses have resisted any action up until now for fear
of legal reprisals, in other words, if they pursue better
escrow or insurance policies, that might be considered
an admission of guilt and open them up to lawsuits
by unhappy auction winners.
Advantages and disadvantages.Without any a priori
knowledge of biased interventions in their own auc-
tions, we are not certain that instituting government
oversight will create more problems than it solves.
Still, adding government oversight will make the
entire system more transparent. Further, if auction
houses could be shielded from some legal liability
through an oversight process, it might give them
incentives to implement anti-fraud policies rather
than simply claim they are a neutral market and are
not at all responsible for members’ trades.
Buyer precautions. There are many tools available
on the Internet to help either party verify the infor-
mation given by a seller. Examples:
• Auction houses should ask a buyer (and seller)
during the registration process to provide a
phrase/code that is known only to them. Any
email message coming from the auction house to
him should have that phrase displayed in it. This
enables the buyer (or seller) screen out fraudulent
messages.
• Putting the name of a company and the word
“fraud” or “scam” into a search engine like
Google.
• Check with the Chamber of Commerce and Bet-
ter Business Bureau regarding the company.
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• Do a telephone number search (a reverse search
and check the name of the party owning that
number); legitimate companies should have their
own number. The buyer can also call that num-
ber to make sure that a live entity is behind that
number. You can also cross match it to an email
address.
• Occasionally, a seller asks to send cash or equiva-
lent. What one can do is send an email saying
that “by coincidence I am passing through your
city. Can I drop by, pay in cash, and pick up the
item?” If the seller does not respond, or says I
only ship, do not do business with that person.
Smart crooks could bluff, however, so there is no
guarantee.
• Through the exchange of email, one acquires
much more information about the entity with
which one is dealing. Phone number, name,
address, tracing the routing of response messages
and so forth. Then one can use the Internet to
check on the entity, as discussed earlier. If the
seller does not respond to your questions/email
this should raise suspicion.
• Always pay with a credit card. Some sellers will
not sell the item to you, but that is the price you
pay for security. Some swindlers allow PayPal, but
they only accept the one that comes from your
bank account, not the kind of charge that comes
through your credit card.
• When you receive a package, open it in front of
the delivery person or company representative.
You can tell your delivery company not to drop
off without a signature.
• Go to an “eBay Xchange Point,” or something
equivalent. In Switzerland, eBay has proposed
meeting points at major train stations where buy-
ers and sellers can meet face-to-face to inspect the
goods and pay for them. This is not entirely prac-
tical for goods bought far away, but for more
local transactions, nothing beats face-to-face.
• Chua [2, 3] also proposes being more proactive in
reporting and preventing fraud through such
techniques as collective action on reporting (for
example, to Traderlist), contacting other potential
victims directly, or even “vigilantism” in which
buyers deliberately sabotage auctions they feel are
fraudulent.
Advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of
buyer precautions are obvious, they reduce fraud and
make it more difficult for crooks. They do not cost
as much, if anything, to implement. The disadvan-
tages are that not everyone would take advantage of
them.
CONCLUSION
Auction houses today appear to be at a crossroads,
with many people now losing confidence in the sys-
tem [8]:
“...do you have a reasonable expectation that the
Mac G5 you are bidding on is going to be shipped to
you? How about the Sony plasma 60-inch monitor?
Or, the Sony PSP for $50 to $100 over retail? No, you
don’t. Now, you might say, ‘Hey, moron! Why are you
bidding on stuff like that on eBay? Don’t you know
that 95% of those auctions are fraudulent, especially
the ones that only accept payment via Western
Union?’ Of course, I know. But what about all of the
people who don’t?”
Now is the time to act before the negative cycle
mentioned at the beginning of this article develops in
full swing. We hope that some of the recommenda-
tions listed here restore the public’s confidence in the
system.While it may be impossible to eliminate Inter-
net auction fraud, at the very least we may be able to
reduce it drastically and make it very expensive for
those who persist.
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